Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror
Michael Scheuer
Brassey’s Inc., 2004
xxi + 309 pages
They hate us because we’re free. That was the mantra we heard for years after the 9/11 attacks. The “they” were, of course, radical Muslims bent on destroying our civilisation so the argument went. Why did they care about our civilisation anyway? Because they were Muslim crazies. That’s why!
One of the few experts on terrorism who argued otherwise was Michael Scheuer; he was head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Desk for several years. His argument is simple: Muslim terrorists do not hate the West because it is free. They hate the United States and its allies because they see Uncle Sam as an imperial meddler, warmonger and exploiter. Simply put, Muslim terrorists hate “us” because from their perspective “the things they most love and value – God, Islam, their brethren and Muslim lands – are being attacked by America.” (p. 9)
When this book came out, it went down the Orwellian memory hole. It gained prominence several years after publication when American politician Ron Paul took up Scheuer’s argument (Muslims hate us because of what we do) during his bid for the presidency in 2008. It is not a history book, although the author uses history to make his case. Nevertheless, I think Imperial Hubris has value for the historian who can see how pundits, “experts” and politicians framed the so-called war on terror twenty years ago. We can also see how the war was being fought, and how men like Scheuer suggested a different path in order to defeat Muslim terrorists. In a sense, the book has become a primary source for historians.
So how persuasive is Scheuer’s argument? Very. He dismantles claims that Osama bin Laden and his ilk are crazies. They are rational actors attacking the United States to achieve rational ends: force the US out of Muslim holy lands and make the US bankrupt itself. Moreover, millions of Muslims round the world see bin Laden as a modern-day Robin Hood who is prepared to suffer and fight on their behalf. How does the author prove his case? It is simple really. He quotes bin Laden and other terrorists extensively. Moreover, he cites what other Muslims say about him. For example, after listing nearly a dozen approving statements from average Muslims, Scheuer then argues that a Saudi Arabian cleric’s reaction to the 9/11 attacks may represent the views of millions of Muslims around the world:
“You have given us weapons,” the cleric told bin Laden, “you have given us hope and we thank Allah for you…People are now supporting us more, even those who did not support us in the past…[E]verybody praises what you did, the great action you did, which was first and foremost by the Grace of Allah. This is the guidance of Allah, and the blessed fruit of jihad.” (p. 123)
Osama bin Laden is not a madman looking to bring on the Apocalypse. His admirers describe him as a soldier, a CEO, a pious scholar, a warrior and a man of the people. Compared to the “eunuch like” leaders of Middle Eastern regimes, bin Laden is the real thing. But Scheuer thinks there is something more here. Many in the Muslim world love him too. Perhaps not Osama bin Laden the man “but love for his defense of the faith, the life he lives, the heroic example he sets, and the similarity of that example to other heroes in the pantheon of Islamic history.” (p.124)
Having proved that Muslim terrorism is the product of American foreign policy, and that Osama bin Laden and other terrorists are seen as heroes fighting the good fight, what does Scheuer believe America should do? One might think bring the troops home, stop meddling in Muslim lands, promote trade and peaceful co-operation and perhaps stop immigration from Muslim countries. Although he suggests that American foreign policy needs to change (without going into much detail), this is not the line Scheuer takes. Indeed, for much of the book he is very coy about what he proposes. There are hints though, ominous ones. He approvingly quotes General Curtis Lemay, of Vietnam infamy, “You’ve got to kill people, and when you’ve killed enough of them they stop fighting.” (p. 86) Later he approvingly alludes to Sherman’s March to the Sea and quotes Admiral Halsey’s way to victory over the Japanese Empire, “kill Japs, kill Japs, kill more Japs” and keep killing them until “Japanese is only spoken in hell.” (p. 181).
Near the end of his book, Scheuer finally states his solution clearly: the American government needs to stop fighting a half-hearted war that is more like an act of policing. Instead, Americans need to realise they are in a real war, major casualties are inevitable, and many people will die. When it comes to the Muslim world, a lot of Muslims need to die too, “The piles of dead will include as many or more civilians as combatants because our enemy wears no uniforms.” (p. 241) However, killing thousands or millions of Muslims is not enough,
With killing must come a Sherman-like razing of infrastructure. Roads and irrigation systems; bridges, power plants, and crops in the field; fertilizer plants and grain mills – all these and more will need to be destroyed to deny the enemy its support base. (p. 241)
When he wrote these words, the US military was fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. How many millions of Muslims would have died had Scheuer got his way? Why would they need to die anyway? Would it not have been easier for America to simply follow a peaceful foreign policy and send the troops home? That is what Ron Paul called for in 2008 (and 2012). I think Scheuer would have seen this as an act of weakness. This is really where I part company with him. Having made an excellent historical case why the Muslim world hates the United States government, I think he draws exactly the wrong conclusions on how to end the war on the Muslim world. It is fortunate that he never got his way because the American government would be even more hated. Stacks of human skulls would no longer be equated with just the Khmer Rouge.
The Americans retreated from Iraq years ago, and, as I write this in the summer of 2021, they are retreating from Afghanistan after twenty years. Of course, Osama bin Laden is long dead, but his goal of bankrupting America seems well under way. Estimates vary, but the cost of the war on terror has run into the trillions.
